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COMMMENTS 
PUTTING THE HOUSE IN ORDER: AN ANALYSIS OF 
AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR HOME 
OFFICE DEDUCTION 
Section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to 
deduct expenses incurred with respect to his home office only if 
the home office qualifies as a principal place of business, is a 
place of business where he meets or deals with patients, clients, or 
customers, or is in a separate structure detached from his resi-
dence. These exceptions, designed to permit a home office de-
duction only to deserving taxpayers, have been a point of 
contention between the Internal Revenue Service and taxpayers. 
In this comment, the author examines the statutory components 
. of section 280A, reviews the decisional law, suggests possible 
methods for resolution of inconsistencies in judicial interpreta-
tion and application of the section, and posits tax planning 
considerations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The home office deduction has been the source of an ongoing strug-
gle between the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Ser-
vice). For years, taxpayers prevailed in this confrontation because of the 
liberal standards used by the courts in allowing the deductions. Unfortu-
nately, these victories led to taxpayer abuse and eventually drew the at-
tention of Congress. Determined to curtail taxpayer abuse, Congress, in 
1976, enacted section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), a gen-
eral exclusionary statute providing only limited exceptions. Subse-
quently, the Service, armed with the new highly restrictive statute, 
became the overwhelming winner in the battle over home office deduc-
tions as both deserving and nondeserving taxpayers were denied deduc-
tions. Recently, however, the pendulum has .swung back in favor of the 
taxpayers as the courts have begun to apply an increasingly liberal read-
ing to section 280A. 
This comment begins with an overview of section 280A. Following 
this overview, the discussion focuses on three of the more litigated areas 
regarding the home office deduction: the exclusive use requirement, the 
principal place of business exception, and the use by patients, clients, or 
customers in meeting or dealing exception. An amendment to the statu-
tory language of this latter requirement is suggested. Finally, this com-
ment presents a technical roadmap through section 280A, and suggests 
possible tax planning considerations, problems, and opportunities. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 280A 
A. Pre-Section 280A 
Before the enactment of section 280A in 1976,1 home office deduc-
tions were governed by sections 162,2 167,3 and 212.4 With respect to the 
home office, these sections provided deductions for "ordinary and neces-
sary" expenses incurred in carrying on a "trade or business" or "for the 
production of income."S The major limitation on the home office deduc-
tion was set forth in section 262,6 which disallowed deductions for per-
sonal expenses not specifically allowed by the Code.7 
In 1962, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 62-180 to govern home office 
deductions.8 The Ruling required that the taxpayer establish the follow-
ing: (1) the portion of his residence used as a home office; (2) its regular 
use; (3) the extent of use; (4) that the use was a condition of employment; 
and (5) the pro rata portion of maintenance expenses attributable to such 
use. 9 The courts' interpretation of the applicable sections, however, dif-
fered from the position espoused by the IRS,lO and as might be expected, 
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 601.90, Stat. 1520, 1569-72 (1976) 
(codified at I.R.C. § 280A (1982». 
2. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982». Section 162(a) in 
essence allows a deduction for expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or 
business, see I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982), but is now preempted with respect to the home 
office deduction by section 280A. [d. § 280A(a). 
3. 1.R.c. § 167(a) (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982». Section 167(a) 
allows a deduction for depreciation of property used in a trade or business, or held 
for the production of income, see I.R.C. § 167(a)(1)-(2) (1982), but is now pre-
empted with respect to the home office deduction by section 280A. [d. § 280A(a). 
4. I.R.C. § 212(1) (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 212(1) (1982». Section 212(1) in 
pertinent part allows a deduction for expenses paid or incurred in the production or 
collection of income, see I.R.C. § 212(1) (1982), but is now preempted with respect 
to the home office deduction by section 280A. [d. § 280A(a). 
5. See, e.g., Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970) ("ordinary and neces-
sary" expenses of maintaining a home office deductible under section 162); Hall v. 
United States, 387 F. Supp. 612 (1975) (same); Peiss v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 78 
(1963) (same); Wisconsin Psychiatric Servs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839 
(1981) (depreciation deduction allowed under section 167 for portion of home used 
by taxpayer in his trade or business); Aslam v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1217 (1981) (same); Furmanski v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 225 (1974) 
(same); Imhoff v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 978 (1980) (expenses incurred 
for the production of income deductible under section 212); Scott v. Commissioner, 
31 T.C.M. (CCH) 439 (1972) (same); Semel v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1176 (1965) (same). 
6. I.R.C. § 262 (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 262 (1982». Section 262 in perti-
nent part disallows any deduction for personal, living, or family expenses that are 
not otherwise expressly excepted, see I.R.C. § 262 (1982), but is now preempted 
with respect to the home office deduction by section 280A. [d. § 280A(a). 
7. See, e.g., Sharon v. Commissioner, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978) (personal expenses 
incurred in maintaining a home office not deductible under section 262); Bodzin v. 
Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) 
(same); Meehan v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 794 (1976) (same). 
8. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52. 
9. [d. at 52-53. 
10. Compare Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52 (providing a strict five-part test), with 
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a flood of litigation followed. 
The most significant interpretation of the statutory "ordinary and 
necessary" requirement came in Newi v. Commissioner, II a 1970 decision 
in which the Second Circuit interpreted "ordinary and necessary" as re-
quiring that the expense merely be "appropriate and helpful."12 The Ser-
vice argued that an employee was not eligible for a home office deduction 
unless maintenance of the home office was a "condition of his employ-
ment."13 The Second Circuit rejected the Service's position, and merely 
focused on the "appropriate and helpful" nature of the taxpayer's home 
office in the performance of his employment. 14 
In Bodzin v. Commissioner,15 the tax court further liberalized the 
requirements for home office expense deductions. In Bodzin, the tax-
payer worked as an attorney-adviser for the IRS. Although the IRS did 
not require its employees to work evenings or weekends, the taxpayer 
nonetheless worked two or three evenings a week, and three to five hours 
on weekends in his home office. 16 The tax court, with four judges dis-
senting, found the home office expenses "necessary" because they were 
"appropriate and helpful" in conducting the taxpayer's business. 17 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the tax court's decision 18 
and held that the rental of an apartment was a nondeductible personal 
Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970) (providing a liberal "appropri-
ate and helpful" standard), aff'g, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 686 (1969) and Gino v. Com-
missioner, 60 T.C. 304 (1973) (not requiring a strict adherence to the Revenue 
Ruling). 
11. 432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970). The taxpayer, a salesman of television time for the 
American Broadcasting Company, spent three hours each evening in his home 
study reviewing his day's notes, studying various research materials, and viewing 
the television advertisements of his employer and their competitors. ld. at 999. 
Although the study was used exclusively for his occupational activities, the taxpayer 
was not required by his employer to maintain the home office and was provided with 
adequate office space that could be used during evening hours. ld. at 999-1000. 
The taxpayer, however, would have missed several programs if he were forced to 
travel back to his work office at the end of the day because of the traffic and conges-
tion of New York City. ld. 
12.ld. 
13.ld. 
14. ld. at 1000. The Commissioner expressed concern that the court's decision might 
open the door for a business deduction to any employee engaged in an activity at 
home that could be construed as helpful to his employer. The Second Circuit 
stated: "The Commissioner need have no such concern. This case opens the doors 
just long enough to enable this Taxpayer to pass through it into his cloistered study 
to pursue his business." ld. 
15. 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev 'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). 
16. ld. at 821-23. 
17. ld. at 824-26. The court stated: "We have found ... that the expenses at issue 
were directly related and pertained to his business - that of a Government attor-
ney. It makes no difference that the petitioner was not required to maintain a home 
office, that he wanted merely to do a good job, and that he liked his work." ld. at 
826. 
18. Bodzin V. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), rev'g 60 T.C. 820 (1973), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). 
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expense under section 262. The appeals court found it unnecessary to 
consider the "appropriate and helpful" standard, but did suggest that if 
the taxpayer could show that his work office was "unavailable or unsuita-
ble" for the activities carried on in his home office, he might then qualify 
for a deduction.l9 In Sharon v. Commissioner,20 the tax court, faced with 
facts similar to Bodzin,21 abandoned the "appropriate and helpful" test 
and adopted a liberal version of the Fourth Circuit's "unavailable or un-
suitable" test.22 
B. The Enactment of Section 280A 
In response to the uncertainties created by the conflicts between the 
various courts and the Service, Congress enacted section 280A.23 The 
reports from both the House and Senate expressed displeasure with the 
results that courts had reached under the "appropriate and helpful" test, 
and emphasized that personal and family expenses would no longer be 
treated as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, especially when 
those expenses did not result in an additional or incremental cost in-
curred through the business use of a home.24 In enacting section 280A, 
Congress intended to provide definitive rules to replace the SUbjective 
"appropriate and helpful" test.25 
19. [d. at 681. 
20. 66 T.e. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
442 U.S. 941 (1979). 
21. In both Bodzin and Sharon, the taxpayers were employed as attorneys by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. Neither taxpayer was required to maintain a home office nor 
to work beyond regular hours. Similarly, both taxpayers were provided with work 
offices available at anytime. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 517-18 (1976), 
aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); 
Bodzin V. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 821, 823 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1978). 
22. Sharon, 66 T.e. at 524. The tax court applied a balancing test for deductions, not-
ing the precedence of section 262 over section 162. [d. For a detailed discussion of 
the history of the home office deduction before the enactment of section 280A, see 
Note, The Deductibility of Home Office Expenses Under Section 280A: Personal Con-
venience vs. Business Necessity, 36 TAX LAW. 1199, 1201-05 (1983). 
23. See H.R. REp. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897, 3053; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3579. 
24. The reports expressed concern over the ability of taxpayers to convert nondeduct-
ible personal and family expenses into deductible business expenses simply because, 
under the facts of the particular case, it was "appropriate and helpful" to his trade 
or business to do a portion of his work at home. H.R. REp. No. 658, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 160 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897,3054; 
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3579-80. 
25. The House and Senate committees found that the "appropriate and helpful" test 
increased the inherent administrative problems because of the subjective nature of 
the test. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1975), reprinted in 1976 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897,3053; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
147 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439,3579. 
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The general rule of section 280A 26 provides that "no deduction. . . 
shall be allowed with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used 
by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence."27 The general 
rule, however, is inapplicable to the extent that the expense item is allo-
cable to a portion of the dwelling unit2s that is exclusively used on a 
regular basis:29 
26. The text of section 280A provides in pertinent part: 
§ 280A. Disallowance of certain expenses in connection with busi-
ness use of home, rental of vacation homes, etc. 
(a) General Rule. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, in 
the case of a taxpayer who is an individual or an S corporation, no deduc-
tion otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed with respect 
to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the 
taxable year as a residence. 
(b) Exception for interest, taxes, casualty losses, etc. - Subsection 
(a) shall not apply to any deduction allowable to the taxpayer without 
regard to its connection with his trade or business (or with his income-
producing activity). 
(c) Exceptions for certain business or rental use: limitation on de-
ductions for such use. -
(1) Certain business use. - Subsection (a) shall not apply to any 
item to the extent such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling 
unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis. -
(A) [as] the principal place of business for any trade or 
business of the taxpayer, 
(B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, 
or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the nor-
mal course of his trade or business, or 
(C) in the case of a separate structure which is not attached 
to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or 
business. 
In the case of an employee, the preceding sentence shall apply only if the 
exclusive use referred to in the preceding sentence is for the convenience of 
his employer. 
I.R.C. § 280A(a)-(c)(I) (1982). 
27. Id. § 280A(a). 
28. The proposed regulations for section 280A state that: "For purposes of . . . this 
section, the phrase 'a portion of the dwelling unit' refers to a room or other sepa-
rately identifiable space; it is not necessary that the portion be marked off by a 
permanent partition." Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(g)(l) (proposed July 21, 
1983). 
The tax court found that a permanent partition was unnecesary, but that the 
absence of a partition was a factor for the court to weigh in determining whether 
there was in fact a separate area used exclusively and regularly for a business pur-
pose. Weightman v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 (1981). 
In Gomez v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 585 (1980), the taxpayer used 
furniture and furnishings in her living room for business purposes. The court, how-
ever, could find no specific portion of the room that was used exclusively for busi-
ness and, therefore, denied the deduction. Id. But see Weightman v. Commissioner, 
42 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 (1981) (court found taxpayer's testimony credible as to the 
existence of a specific portion of the room used exclusively for business purposes). 
29. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(I) (1982); see infra notes 39-58 and accompanying text. The term 
"regular basis" is not defined in section 280A. The Congressional reports state that, 
"[e]xpenses attributable to incidental or occasional trade or business use ... [are] 
not [to] be deductible." The reports, however, provide no further guidance. H.R. 
REp. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONGo 
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(1) as the taxpayer's principal place of business,3o or 
(2) as a place which is used by patients, clients, or customers in 
meeting or dealing with the taxpayer.3) 
Moreover, if a separate structure, unattached to the taxpayer's 
home, is used exclusively and regularly by the taxpayer in connection 
with his trade or business, then a deduction will be allowed.32 When an 
employee maintains a home office, a deduction is available only if the 
home office is for the "convenience of his employer."33 Finally, section 
& AD. NEWS 2897, 3055; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148-49 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3581. Additionally, the 
IRS's proposed regulations posit a "facts and circumstances" test to determine "reg-
ular use." Proposed Treas. Reg. § l.280A-2(h) (proposed Aug. 7, 1980). In 1981 
the tax court ruled that occasional and irregular business use of a home office was 
insufficient. See Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981); see also Borom v. 
Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 179, 185 (1980) (intermittent use of home office 
does not satisfy "regular basis" requirement). 
30. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(I)(A) (1982); see infra notes 59-113 and accompanying text. Sec-
tion 280A permits deductions only to taxpayers carrying on a "trade or business." 
Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Moller v. United States, 721 
F.2d 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983), held that home office expenses incurred by taxpayers for 
the "production of income" are not deductible. In Mol/er, the taxpayers spent 40 or 
more hours each week managing their large investment portfolio from their home 
office. The court found that the taxpayers were more interested in earning income 
through long-term appreciation and dividends, rather than from short-term profit 
on sales of securities. Therefore, they were not engaged in a "trade or business" and 
not eligible for home office deductions. Id. at 811-15; accord Shaller v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 10 (1984). 
The tax court, in Meiers v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1984), stated 
in dictum that ownership and management activities are important attributes of a 
"trade or business." In Meiers, the taxpayers performed only liniited accounting 
duties and did not engage in any managerial functions. Consequently, the court 
held that the taxpayers were not in a "trade or business," and thus not eligible for a 
home office deduction. [d.; see also Gestrich v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 525 (1980), 
a./J'd, 681 F.2d 80S (3d Cir. 1982); Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). 
31. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(I)(B) (1982); see infra notes 114-59 and accompanying text. 
32. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(I)(C) (1982). A deduction will be allowed when a separate struc-
ture is used "exclusively" and "regularly" in connection with a taxpayer's trade or 
business. The subsection does not require that the separate structure be the tax-
payer's "principal place of business" or that it be used as a place of business for 
"meeting or dealing." The exception may be less stringent because the cost of main-
taining a separate structure that is used exclusively for business is usually substan-
tial. The tax court has ruled that a garage attached to a house does not meet the 
requirements of section 280A(c)(I)(C). Garvey v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1003 (1982); see also Borom v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 179 (1980) (hold-
ing that a carport attached to a house does not qualify as a "separate structure"). 
For a further discussion of the separate structure exception, see Kulsrud, Recent 
Statutory and Judicial Developments Have Liberalized Home Office Deductions, 56 J. 
TAX'N 344, 349 (1982). 
33. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(I) (1982). Neither the statute nor the legislative history defines 
"convenience of [the] employer." The Congressional reports, however, do make it 
clear that the old "appropriate and helpful" test is no longer valid. H.R. REp. No. 
658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160-61 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 2897, 3053-55; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147-48 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439,3579-80. For a discussion of 
the "convenience of [the] employer" test, see Ward, Home Office Deductions: The 
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280A sets a limit on the amount of expenses deductible in any taxable 
year. 34 
In Curphey v. Commissioner,35 the IRS maintained that section 
280A permitted only one "principal place of business" for each taxpayer. 
The tax court, however, ruled that a taxpayer could have more than one 
"principal place of business" if he had more than one trade or business. 36 
The Service refused to acquiesce in the Curphey holding and steadfastly 
maintained that a taxpayer could have only one "principal place of 
business." 37 
Congress settled the dispute in 1981 by amending section 280A to 
allow a deduction if the taxpayer's residence is used "as the principal 
place of business of any trade or business of the taxpayer."38 Congress 
has not, unfortunately, reacted to other problems regarding the interpre-
tation of section 280A with the same speed and guidance. 
For instance, the courts have not squarely considered whether inci-
dental personal use of a home office will disqualify the taxpayer for a 
deduction under the "exclusive use" test. Furthermore, two tests have 
emerged for determining a taxpayer's "principal place of business." In 
addition, the tax court recently gave an expanded reading to "patients, 
clients, or customers" and has rejected its prior view of that clause. 
Lastly, the tax court has reversed its interpretation of "meeting or deal-
ing" from a liberal stance to a more conservative one. Section 280A is in 
a state of flux and is in need of both judicial and legislative action. 
III. AREAS OF LITIGATION 
A. "Exclusive Use" 
Meeting the "exclusive use" test is a prerequisite for any home office 
deduction for it applies to all three of the exceptions enumerated in sec-
tion 280A(c).39 The term "exclusive use" implies a standard precluding 
even incidental personal use of the home office, and that implication is 
supported by the legislative history. Common sense, however, suggests 
that a minimal amount of personal use should not disqualify the 
taxpayer. 
The Congressional reports posit a strict test, requiring that a tax-
payer use a separate part of his residence "solely" for business to satisfy 
Development and Current Status of Section 280A(c)(J), 13 CUM. L. REv. 195,213-14 
(1982). 
34. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5) (1982); see infra notes 186-210 and accompanying text. 
35. 73 T.C. 766 (1980). 
36. Id. at 775-76. The taxpayer worked full time as a dermatologist at a hospital and 
also owned six rental properties that he managed from his home. [d. at 767. 
37. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(2) (proposed Aug. 7, 1980); see also Private 
Letter Ruling 8030024, 179 I.R.S. LTR. RuL. (CCH) 8030024 (Apr. 28, 1980). 
38. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, § 113,95 Stat. 1635, 
1641-43 (1981) (emphasis added). The amendment was made retroactive to tax 
years after 1975. [d. 
39. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1982). 
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the "exclusive use" test.40 The reports set forth the following example: 
"[A] taxpayer who uses a den in his dwelling unit to write legal briefs, 
prepare tax returns, or engage in similar activities as well for personal 
purposes, will be denied a deduction .... "41 Applying this example, 
the tax court, in Weiner v. Commissioner,42 denied a deduction to a tax-
payer when her home office was used for both business and pleasure.43 
Similarly, in Chauls v. Com missioner, 44 a high school music teacher who 
used half of his L-shaped living room primarily for rehearsals of the 
school's chorus and opera4S failed to meet the "exclusive use" test be-
cause he held occasional parties in the entire living room area.46 Not 
surprisingly, the Service has adopted the strict standard in its proposed 
regulations, seizing upon Congress's use of "solely" in the committee 
reports.47 
To inject the term "solely" into the "exclusive use" test would de-
feat virtually all home office deductions because nearly all home offices 
are used for personal purposes from time to time. Just as business offices 
located outside of the home are often used for incidental personal pur-
poses, such as making non-business telephone calls and writing personal 
letters, home offices are also unavoidably used for these same minimal 
personal purposes. It would be impractical and imprudent to disqualify 
deductions to taxpayers for such de minimis use48 and would frustrate 
40. H.R. REp. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897,3054; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439,3581. 
41. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897, 3054-55, S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3581. 
42. 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 977 (1980). 
43. Id. at 978. The taxpayer used a room in her apartment for both personal purposes 
and to search for employment as an actress, hostess, demonstrator, or model. Id. at 
977-78. The petitioner initially testified that her use of the room was exclusively for 
business but later admitted that the room was also used for personal purposes. Id. at 
978. 
44. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1980). 
45. Id. at 235. The business portion of the room contained a grand piano, bench, chair, 
and stereo receiver. Id. 
46. Id. at 235-36. The tax court determined that the taxpayer's home office was neither 
his "principal place of business," nor a place to meet or deal with patients, clients, 
or customers. In dictum, the Chauls court concluded that the taxpayer did not 
meet the "exclusive use" test. Id. 
Under similar circumstances, the tax court denied a deduction when the tax-
payer used a room as his office and as his bedroom because the taxpayer failed to 
show that the room was used "exclusively" for business purposes. Odom V. Com-
missioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1132 (1982). 
47. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(g)(I) (proposed July 21, 1983). The proposed reg-
ulations require that there be "no use" of the home office "at any time" for nonbusi-
ness purposes. Id. 
48. See Lang, When a House is Not Entirely a Home: Deductions Under Internal Reve-
nue Code § 280A for Home Offices. Vacation Homes. etc., 25 UTAH L. REv. 275, 
290-91 (1981); Note, The Home Office Deduction, 25 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 607, 613 
(1981). 
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the Congressional goal of providing home office deductions to deserving 
taxpayers.49 
Notwithstanding Congress's use of "solely," and the burden of proof 
placed on the taxpayer, the "exclusive use" test has proven to be a diffi-
cult issue for the Service to prevail on when the home office is in a sepa-
rate room. In Green v. Commissioner,50 the IRS contested the taxpayer's 
home office deduction claiming that the taxpayer failed to satisfy the "ex-
clusive use" test. 51 The taxpayer testified that he had converted a bed-
room into an office and used the telephone in that room strictly for 
business. The Service was unable to produce evidence of personal use by 
the taxpayer and on cross-examination did not undermine his credibility. 
On these facts, the tax court concluded that the taxpayer had met his 
burden of proof. 52 It therefore seems difficult for the IRS to rebut a tax-
payer's testimony by merely contending that the room was not exclu-
sively used. 53 
Although section 280A requires that the home office be used exclu-
sively for business purposes, a deduction will be allowed even if the home 
office is used in part for a non-qualified business purpose. In Frankel v. 
Commissioner ,54 the tax court was presented with a situation where both 
the husband and wife used the same room for business purposes. Even 
though the husband used the room exclusively and regularly in connec-
tion with his occupation, he met neither the "principal place of business" 
nor the "meeting or dealing" exception of section 280A. Thus, the hus-
band's use did not qualify for a home office deduction. 55 The wife's use, 
however, did meet all the requirements of section 280A.56 The Frankel 
49. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
50. 78 T.C. 428, rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983). 
51. [d. at 432. The IRS also claimed that the taxpayer's converted bedroom was neither 
his "principal place of business" nor regularly used as a place of business to meet or 
deal with patients, clients, or customers. [d. 
52. [d. Regarding the burden of proof in tax cases, the law is well settled that deduc-
tions are a matter of legislative grace and that a taxpayer seeking a deduction must 
prove that he satisfies the terms of the applicable statute allowing such deduction. 
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,440 (1934). The Service's deter-
minations in the notice of deficiency are presumed to be correct and the taxpayer 
bears the burden of proving any error in such determination. Welch v. Helvering, 
290 U.S. lll, 115 (1933); TAX Cr. R. PRAC. & PROC. 142(a). For a discussion on 
meeting this burden of proof, see infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text. 
53. See Thalacker v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1104 (1984) (court found there 
was "exclusive use" based solely on taxpayer's credible testimony); Weightman v. 
Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 (1981) (same). But see Andrews v. Commis-
sioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1533 (1981) (exclusive use not shown). See generally 
Note, The Home Office Deduction, 25 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 607, 613-15 (1981) (Com-
missioner often concedes "exclusive use" and attacks the home office deduction on 
other grounds). 
54. 82 T.e. 318 (1984). 
55. [d. at 329. 
56. [d. at 319-22. Mrs. Frankel was involved in preparing a report for the U.S. Comp-
troller of the Currency that required both researching and interviewing. [d. at 322. 
She used the home office to store her notes and to write the report. Mrs. Frankel's 
fee was based on the Comptroller's estimate that the study would take only 35 days. 
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court held it unnecessary to allocate the home office expenses between 
Mr. and Mrs. Frankel, and granted the taxpayers the full home office 
deduction. 57 
The holding in Frankel comports with the language in section 
1.280A-2(g)(1) of the proposed Treasury Regulations, which states that 
to qualify for a deduction there must be no use of the portion of the 
dwelling unit at any time during the year other than for business pur-
poses. 58 The Regulation does not require that there be only one business 
use, it requires only that there be no personal use. The Frankels satisfied 
this requirement because Mr. Frankel's use, though not qualifying under 
section 280A, was nevertheless for business purposes. 
In sum, a room used as a home office may be put to many different 
business purposes and still qualify for a deduction under section 280A. 
When the room, however, is also used by the taxpayer as extra space for 
a party, a place to watch television, or for other personal matters, the 
taxpayer risks the loss of the entire deduction. 
B. "Principal Place of Business" 
Perhaps no other area involving section 280A creates more litigation 
than the "principal place of business" exception. The controversy nar-
rows to a factual detennination of where the taxpayer's "principal place 
of business" is located. The taxpayer attempts to prove that his "princi-
pal place of business" is in his home, while the Service attempts to prove 
that it is elsewhere. The tax court has applied a stringent "focal point" 
test, which turns on where the taxpayer's goods or services are ex-
changed. 59 This test follows the legislative intent of section 280A and, as 
such, has frustrated most taxpayer claims.60 Recently, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit has developed a "time and importance" test, which analyzes 
the amount of time consumed by the activity and the activity'S impor-
tance to the taxpayer's occupation.61 This test has provided unwarranted 
deductions to taxpayers and is essentially a step backward toward the 
"appropriate and helpful" test. The Second Circuit has overruled the tax 
court twice in reaching its results62 and the possibility of reconciliation 
Mrs. Frankel, however, worked full time on the project from the end of January to 
the beginning of March and part time thereafter until late November making revi-
sions and incorporating new material. Id. 
57. /d. at 323-30. 
58. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(g)(I) (proposed July 21, 1983). 
59. See Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 109 (1980); Aab v. Commissioner, 42 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1519, 1521 (1981); see also Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 
616, 623 (1982) (Wilbur, J., dissenting), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983). 
60. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981); Baie v. Commissioner, 74 
T.C. 105 (1980). 
61. See Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512,514 (2d Cir. 1984); Drucker v. Com-
missioner, 715 F.2d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1983). 
62. See Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'g 47 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 520 (1983); Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 
T.C. 605 (1982). 
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between the two courts is unlikely. A clarification by the Supreme Court 
of the appropriate test would be helpful. 
The "focal point" test originated in Baie v. Commissioner,63 a 1980 
case before the tax court. In Baie, the taxpayer operated a hot dog stand 
about one mile from her home. As a result of limited space, the taxpayer 
prepared the food for the stand in her home kitchen. In addition, the 
taxpayer used a second bedroom in her home to maintain the stand's 
records and other paperwork.64 The tax court stated that "[n]othing in 
the legislative history of section 280A or the Commissioner's regulations 
furnishes any guidance as to the scope of the 'principal place of business' 
concept in the context of section 280A."6s The court, therefore, found it 
necessary to provide guidance and concluded that the "focal point" of 
the business activities determines the taxpayer's "principal place of busi-
ness."66 Applying its new test, the Baie court found that the taxpayer 
did not meet the "principal place of business" exception.67 Although the 
tax court recognized that Mrs. Baie's preliminary preparation at home 
was beneficial to the operation of the business, because the final packag-
ing and sales occurred at the stand, the Baie court held that the tax-
payer's "principal place of business" was the stand and not her home.68 
After Baie, the tax court applied the "focal point" test to numerous 
factual situations.69 In each case the "principal place of business" deter-
mination turned on where the goods or services were exchanged.70 Under 
this maxim, because a teacher is paid to teach at school, the school is the 
teacher's "principal place of business."71 Similarly, a nurse's "principal 
place of business" is the hospital,72 and a judge's is the court room.73 
Because the tax court considers the amount of time spent at each location 
63. 74 T.C. 105 (1980). 
64. Id. at 106. 
65. Id. at 109. 
66.Id. 
67. Id. at 109-10. 
68.Id. 
69. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981) (real estate agent with home 
office and office at broker's place of business denied a deduction); Trussell v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 190 (1982) fjudge with home office and chambers at 
court denied a deduction); Weightman v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 
(1981) (college professor with office at home and at school denied a deduction). 
70. See Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105, 109 (1980); Aab v. Commissioner, 42 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1519, 1521 (1981); see also Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 
616, 623 (1982) (Wilbur, J., dissenting), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983). 
71. See, e.g., Moskovit v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 859 (1982), affd by unpub-
lished order, (1Oth Cir. Oct. 19, 1983); Besch v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 
286 (1982), aff'd by unpublished order, (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 1983); Warganz v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 568 (1981), affd by unpublished order, (3d Cir. Oct. 
15, 1982); Cousino v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 722 (1981), affd, 679 F.2d 
604 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982). But cf Weissman V. Commis-
sioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984) (under Second Circuit's "time and importance" 
test, a professor's home office may be his "principal place of business"). 
72. Lopkoff V. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 256, 258 (1982). 
73. Trussel V. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 190, 191-92 (1982). 
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to be only one factor,74 these conclusions hold true even when the tax-
payer works a substantially greater percentage of time in a home office. 
Although the results reached by the tax court under the "focal point" 
test perhaps have denied deductions to some deserving taxpayers,7S the 
results are predictable and further the Congressional intent of limiting 
home office deductions. 
In 1983, however, the Second Circuit reversed the tax court's appli-
cation of the "focal point" test in Drucker v. Commissioner 76 and created 
a new standard. Ernest Drucker was a concert violinist for the Metro-
politan Opera Association (Met).77 The tax court noted that Drucker 
was compensated by the Met for attending rehearsals and performing in 
concerts,18 and that "[a]s a professional musician, petitioner was required 
to practice numerous hours in order to maintain, refine and perfect his 
skill."79 Although as a practical matter, private practice was necessary 
for Drucker to carry on his duties, such off-premise practice was not 
required by his employer. The Met, however, did not provide private 
studios for the necessary solo practice and, consequently, Drucker used 
one room in his apartment exclusively as a private studio thirty hours a 
week. 80 
74. See Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, 612 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 
1983); Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.e. 428, 433 (1982); Jackson v. Commissioner, 
76 T.C. 696, 700 (1981). 
75. See, e.g., Frankel v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 318 (1984); Drucker v. Commissioner, 
79 T.e. 605 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Baie v. Commissioner, 74 
T.C. 105 (1980). 
76. 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 605 (1982). The Second Circuit Drucker 
decision consolidated the claims of three professional musicians. Id. at 68. The tax 
court denied Drucker's claim and on that authority disposed of the other two claims 
by memorandum. See Cherry v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1316 (1982); 
Rogers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1312 (1982). Because the Second Cir-
cuit opinion focuses on the Drucker appeal, this comment will only discuss the facts 
regarding Ernest Drucker [hereinafter referred to as "taxpayer" or "Drucker"]. 
77. Drucker, 79 T.C. at 606. 
78. Id. Drucker was compensated by the Met for the following activities: 
(1) 3 pre-season rehearsal weeks of 27 1/2 hours per week; 
(2) 27 regular-season weeks of 26 hours per week; 
(3) 7 tour weeks of 15 hours per week; 
(4) 2 weeks of park performances; 
(5) 5 vacation weeks; and 
(6) 5 supplemental unemployment weeks. 
Id. 
All rehearsals and regular-season performances were conducted at the Lincoln 
Center in New York City. During his vacation, Drucker performed with the Chau-
tauqua Institution for 49 days and was compensated for those performances by the 
Chautauqua Institution. Id. at 606-07. 
79. Id. at 607. The tax court stated that, "[p]etitioners' parts have to be perfected prior 
to a rehearsal or performance, since every error can be detected by his colleagues 
and his conductor. An error can distract other members of the orchestra, and has 
the potential to disrupt the entire orchestra." Id. at 608. 
80. Id. at 608-09. Drucker's individual practice consisted of reviewing and rehearsing 
the current and upcoming productions, particularly difficult technical passages. Id. 
at 607-08. 
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The nature of the taxpayer's business, the activities it involved, and 
the locations where the Met performed were considered by the tax court 
in determining the "principal place of business." The tax court, in a 
seven to six decision, concluded that the taxpayer was in the "business of 
being an employee."81 Thus, the activities of the petitioner were viewed 
from both the employee's and the employer's viewpoint. The tax court 
stressed that the taxpayer's employer required him to attend group re-
hearsals and performances, but did not require him to practice alone. 
Although Drucker may have spent more time at his home studio than at 
any performance site, the tax court concluded that performing was by far 
the most important business activity, for without performances the Met 
could not exist. 82 
The tax court's majority recognized that there are exceptions to the 
rule that an employee's "principal place of business" is at his employer's 
office. Specifically, the majority noted that the "focal point" for an artist 
may be his studio where he spends hours creating his work and not the 
gallery where his finished work is shown. 83 The majority distinguished a 
musician from an artist in two ways. First, an artist need not be present 
at the gallery during an exhibit, whereas a musician must be at the thea-
ter to present his final product. Second, admirers of art rarely watch an 
artist paint, while music lovers attend a performance specifically to 
watch and to hear a musician play.84 
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority holding and stated 
that the distinction made between artists and musicians was without 
merit. 85 Judge Wilbur, writing for the dissent, explained that an author 
or lecturer is not paid simply for the end product, but is instead paid for 
all the work leading up to that product. Similarly, a musician is "not 
simply compensated for the final moments of the long hours he worked 
everyday; he [is] compensated for the time he [works] in maintaining, 
refining, and perfecting his professional skills on a year-round basis, as 
well as for exhibiting those skills."86 
The Second Circuit reversed the tax court,87 noting that employ-
ment as a professional musician was "a strange way to make a living" 
and that the tax court failed to grasp that reality. 88 The appellate court 
found that home practice was a "condition of employment," and that the 
tax court was clearly erroneous when it found that private practice was a 
necessity but not a "condition of employment."89 The Second Circuit 
81. Id. at 612. The court found that the taxpayer was not in a separate trade or business 
of being a professional musician. Id. at 612-13. 
82. Id. at 613-14. 
83. Id. at 613. 
84.Id. 
85. Id. at 623 & n.8 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). 
86. Id. at 623 (Wilbur, J., dissenting). 
87. Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 605 (1982). 
88. Id. at 69. 
89.Id. 
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stated that it did not have to upset the tax court finding that Drucker was 
in the business of being an employee, but added that this was the "rare 
situation in which an employee's principal place of business is not that of 
his employer."9o Both in time and importance, the court held that the 
home studio was Drucker's "principal place of business." According to 
the Second Circuit, the place of performance was irrelevent as long as the 
musicians were prepared, and preparation resulted from solo practice in 
the home.91 
The Second Circuit reviewed the legislative history of section 280A, 
focusing on the prior abuses of taxpayers in claiming personal living ex-
penses as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, and concluded 
that the law was not enacted to deny deductions to taxpayers like 
Drucker. Although Drucker had no work office, he was still required to 
practice privately, and was thus forced to allocate and maintain extra 
residential space that resulted in additional expenses distinct from his 
nondeductible personal living expenses.92 
The Service announced its non-acquiescence in the Second Circuit 
ruling93 and maintained that in determining a taxpayer's "principal place 
of business," the controlling criterion is not the number of hours spent at 
each location, but is instead how much "business" or other activity with 
income generating potential is performed at each location. The essence 
of the Service's position with respect to Drucker is that because the tax-
payer was paid for performing, and not for practicing, his income-pro-
ducing activity took place at the Met concerts and not at his home 
studio. Hence, the "focal point" of his activities was wherever the Met 
performed. The Service went on to criticize the Second Circuit for 
adopting a standard similar to the old "appropriate and helpful" stan-
dard rejected by Congress in enacting section 280A. Because of the 
unique factual situation involved, however, the Service has decided not to 
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.94 
Following the Drucker decision, the tax court continued to apply its 
strict "focal point" test. 95 Relying on the Drucker rationale, instructors 
who spent more time working in their home office than in their school 
sought to claim deductions.96 But in each case, the tax court found for 
90. /d. 
91. [d. The Drucker court found that the taxpayer spent less than half of his time 
performing at the Lincoln Center for the Met and that those performances were 
made possible only through home practice. Id. 
92. [d. at 69-70. The taxpayer's use of his home office was found to be a business neces-
sity rather than a personal convenience. As such, the home office was maintained 
for the "convenience of his employer." [d. at 70. 
93. See Action on Decision, Drucker v. Commissioner (Dec. 8, 1983) (available April 
25, 1985, on Westlaw, Genfed library, Tax file). 
94. [d. 
95. Meiers v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1984); Bradfield v. Commissioner, 
48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1071 (1984). 
96. Weissman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 
(1984); Sternberg v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 965 (1984). 
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the Commissioner and stated that the Drucker decision applied to very 
limited circumstances and not to teachers.97 The Second Circuit, how-
ever, disagreed.98 
In Weissman v. Commissioner,99 the taxpayer was an associate pro-
fessor of philosophy at City College of the City University of New York. 
Aside from teaching, meeting with students, and grading exams, Weiss-
man "was required to do an unspecified amount of research and writing 
in his field in order to retain his teaching position." 100 The college pro-
vided Weissman with an office on campus but he was required to share it 
with several other professors and the office did not contain a typewriter. 
Moreover, the office was not a safe place to leave his materials or equip-
ment. Weissman was allowed to use the school library, but it did not 
provide him with any reserved space for his research materials or for the 
use of his typewriter; hence, the petitioner set up a home office in his 
apartment. He spent eighty percent of his working hours researching 
and writing in his home office and twenty percent performing teaching 
functions at his campus office. 101 
The Second Circuit found that the tax court's "focal point" test may 
be helpful in many cases, but was inadequate when dealing with a tax-
payer whose occupation involves two very different activities; for exam-
ple, practice and performance as in Drucker, or writing and teaching as 
in Weissman.102 The appeals court observed that the "focal point" of a 
professor's activities is normally the college where he teaches but that 
each case should be examined on its own facts. \03 
The Weissman court, following Drucker, reiterated its "time and im-
portance" test for determining a taxpayer's "principal place of business." 
Interpreting its Drucker decision, the court analyzed the "importance" 
prong by using three factors: (1) the nature of the business activity; (2) 
the characteristics of the space in which such activity can be conducted; 
and (3) the practical need to use a home office. 104 Against this backdrop, 
the court then looks at the key issue: where is the dominant portion of 
the taxpayer's work performed?\05 
Applying this test, the Weissman court found that the taxpayer's 
business activities consisted of both teaching at school and researching 
and writing at home. The court noted that researching and writing re-
97. Weissman, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 522-23; Sternberg, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 967. 
98. Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'g 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 
520 (1983). 
99. 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984). 
100. Id. at 513 (quoting Weissman v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520,521 (1983». 
101. Weissman, 751 F.2d at 513. 
102. Id. at 514. 
103. Id. at 516. 
104. Id. at 514-15. The court noted that the test was very similar to the test set forth in 
proposed regulation § 1.280A-2(b)(3) (proposed July 21, 1983). Id. at 515 0.5. 
105. Id. at 515-16. 
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quires "a place to read, think, and write without interruption . ." 106 
The space provided by the college did not satisfy these needs because of 
the lack of privacy and unsafe conditions. Thus, the use of a home office 
was essential. The court then found that Weissman's home office was the 
site of the great majority of his work and, therefore, concluded that it 
was his "principal place of business." 107 
Judge Kelleher, dissenting in Weissman,lOS predicted that the court 
would face a barrage of home office deduction cases and that the majority 
opinion "opens the doors to an endless array of Section 280A cases; to all 
sorts of 'creative' deductions of home office expenses."109 Researching 
and writing, according to the dissent, were only incidental to the peti-
tioner's primary employment function of teaching. 110 
Congress's two objectives when enacting section 280A were to deny 
business deductions of personal expenses and to provide an objective, eas-
ily applied standard. III The Second Circuit held in both Drucker and 
Weissman that the home office expenses were deductible under section 
280A. In both cases, the Second Circuit reasoned that the expenses 
would not have been incurred but for the taxpayers' occupations, and as 
such, the expenses were for business purposes.112 
A factual comparison of Drucker and Weissman demonstrates that 
the Second Circuit's reasoning in Drucker is persuasive, while the court's 
analysis in Weissman is suspect. As noted by the court, Drucker's use of 
his home office for solo practice was essential to his occupation as a pro-
fessional musician. Concededly, as part of Weissman's duties as a uni-
versity professor, he was required to publish articles. Nonetheless, this 
function was secondary to his primary responsibility of teaching. More-
106. [d. at 515. 
107. [d. at 515-16. 
108. The dissenting opinion, in the two to one decision, was written by Judge Kelleher of 
the United States District Court for the Central District of California who was sit-
ting by designation. [d. at 517-21" (Kelleher, J., dissenting). 
109. [d. at 519 (Kelleher, J., dissenting). It is interesting that this same "floodgates" 
warning was given to the Second Circuit 15 years ago when it allowed a home office 
deduction in Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1970). See supra 
note 14. The Newi case eventually prompted the enactment of section 280A. See 
H.R. REp. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-58, 160 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897,3051,3053-54; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 145, 147 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3577, 
3579-80. 
110. Weissman, 751 F.2d at 517 (Kelleher, J., dissenting). Following Judge Kelleher's 
lead, it is likely that the Commissioner will express his non-acquiescence in the 
Weissman decision and will again chastise the Second Circuit for returning to the 
"appropriate and helpful" standard. 
111. H.R. REp. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897, 3053-54; S. REp. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3579-80; see supra 
notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see also Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 606, 
611-12 (1982), rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983). 
112. Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1984); Drucker v. Commis-
sioner, 715 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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over, Drucker, as a musician, could only practice in a private, quiet 
room, and his employer failed to provide such a room. In contrast, 
Weissman's researching and writing could be accomplished in a room 
that was not private and not quiet. Moreover, Weissman's employer pro-
vided him with a semi-private office and the use of the school library. 
Thus, Weissman is factually distinguished from Drucker, and therefore 
application of the Drucker rule to the Weissman case is inappropriate. 
The Drucker test, refined in Weissman, does very little to promote 
Congress's second goal of objectivity and ease of administration. 
Although this test appears fair and simple, in that it looks to the number 
of working hours spent at each location, problems are inherent in its ap-
plication. For instance, the determination of a taxpayer's "principal 
place of business" imposes difficult evidentiary burdens on the IRS and, 
consequently, the Service is hard pressed to rebut a taxpayer's asser-
tion. II3 Furthermore, determining which activities are "work-related" is 
SUbjective and open to various interpretations, which in turn, lead to in-
creased litigation. In sum, the Second Circuit's test cultivates neither of 
Congress's aims. 
The "focal point" test set forth by the tax court, though not perfect, 
is nonetheless a better measure of the legislative intent of section 280A. 
First, the test furthers Congress's intent of preventing personal expenses 
from being transformed into deductible business expenses. Because the 
test invariably holds that an employee's "principal place of business" is 
his employer's office, only taxpayers who operate a business from their 
home will qualify under the "principal place of business" exception. Ac-
cordingly, the opportunity for a taxpayer to deduct his personal expenses 
under section 280A is necessarily diminished. Second, because determin-
ing where a taxpayer's goods or services are exchanged is straightfor-
ward, the "focal point" test promotes Congress's goal of providing an 
objective and easily administered standard. In sum, although the "focal 
point" test denied Drucker a deduction when apparently he deserved 
one, that result is the cost of a "bright line," workable standard. 
C. "Used by Patients, Clients, or Customers in Meeting or Dealing" 
The second exception to the general disallowance of home office de-
ductions is for the use of a residence as a place to meet or deal with 
patients, clients, or customers. There is no legislative history dealing 
with the language and recent court decisions have been inconsistent in 
the interpretation of the section. Consequently, taxpayers are left with 
little guidance. 
The phrase "patients, clients, or customers" apparently was aimed 
at professionals such as doctors, accountants, insurance salesmen, and 
113. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
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the like. 114 Accordingly, if this type of professional uses a room in his 
home exclusively and regularly to meet with his "patients, clients, or cus-
tomers," then presumably a deduction will be allowed. 
A problem arises, however, for other professionals and for non-pro-
fessionals. In Chauls v. Commissioner, liS the taxpayer was a college mu-
sic instructor who used a portion of his home to meet with members of 
the college opera and choir for rehearsal. The teacher argued that the 
students should be considered his "customers," or at least "customers" 
of the college because they paid tuition to the college. The tax court 
found that under the ordinary definition of "patients, clients, or custom-
ers" the students of the college could not be considered "customers" of 
either the petitioner or the college. I 16 In like fashion, the Service stated 
in a letter ruling that a politician's constituents were not included within 
the statutory phrase. ll7 The Service relied on the exclusionary nature of 
section 280A and concluded that exceptions should be narrowly 
construed. I IS 
In 1982, the tax court expanded the application of "patients, clients, 
or customers" in Green v. Commissioner.119 The taxpayer in Green was 
an employee who was required to be available at night to receive phone 
calls from his employer's clients.12o The tax court found that the "pa-
tients, clients, or customers" exception was not limited to professional 
persons, and cited the "convenience of [the] employer" requirement as 
indicia of Congress's intent that an employee may qualify.121 The tax 
court determined that the petitioner qualified under the exception by re-
ceiving phone calls from his employer's clients,122 thus intimating that an 
employer's "clients" are his employee's "clients" for purposes of section 
280A. 
Two years later the tax court made its position clear in Frankel v. 
Commissioner. 123 The petitioner, an editor of the New York Times, used 
his home office to speak with elected officials, public figures, and employ-
ees of the New York Times. 124 The Commissioner argued that as an 
114. See Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428, 434 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 707 
F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983). 
115. 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1980). 
116. Id. at 236. 
117. See Private Letter Ruling 8048014, 197 IRS LTR. RuL. (CCH) 8048014 (Aug. 26, 
1980). 
118.Id. 
119. 78 T.C. 428 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983); ·see infra 
notes 131-34 and accompanying text. 
120. Green, 78 T.C. at 430. The taxpayer was an account executive responsible for ad-
ministrative and physical management of seven condominiums. Id.; see also infra 
notes 131-34 and accompanying text. 
121. Green, 78 T.C. at 434. 
122. Id. at 436. 
123. 82 T.C. 318 (1984). 
124. Id. at 321. Almost every night Mr. Frankel spoke by telephone from his home office 
with other employees of the Times on work related matters. He also spoke by tele-
phone with "prominent politicians at the national, State, and local levels, labor lead-
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employee of the newspaper, the employee's clients or customers were 
only the readers and subscribers of the newspaper. The tax court found 
this view "unnecessarily restrictive" and cited Green as authority.12s 
Further, the Frankel court decided that the "patients, clients, or custom-
ers" exception should not be narrowly limited to self-employed profes-
sionals, but rather should "be construed to include the types of people 
(exclusive, perhaps, of other employees) with whom employees cus-
tomarily deal in the ordinary course of their employers' trades or busi-
nesses."126 Therefore, the tax court's holding in Frankel allows an 
employee to qualify for a home office deduction when the employee uses 
a home office to deal with his employer's "patients, clients, or 
customers. " 
Further ambiguity in the "used by patients, clients, or customers in 
meeting or dealing" exception involves the interpretation of "meeting or 
dealing." Originally, the tax court, in Green v. Commissioner,127 de-
clared that client-initiated telephone calls to the taxpayer's home office 
constituted a "meeting or dealing."128 The Ninth Circuit, however, re-
versed the tax court's decision in Green, and held that the exception ap-
plied "only to home offices visited by the taxpayer's clients."129 At the 
tax court's next opportunity, it adopted the Ninth Circuit's view. 130 
In Green, the taxpayer was an account executive responsible for 
managing seven condominiums for a real estate development com-
pany. \31 His duties included supervising the resident managers and 
working with each building's board of directors. Green could not be 
reached during much of the workday and as a result he was required to 
be available after work hours to receive phone calls from managers and 
board members. 132 The tax court, with seven judges dissenting, held that 
there was no legislative mandate requiring in-person contact.133 More-
over, in its analysis of the statutory language the tax court opined that if 
the term "meeting" means "in person" contact, then "dealing" must 
mean something different, lest the term be mere surplusage. 134 
The Ninth Circuit, however, looked to the "plain language" of sec-
ers, and other leaders of the community." Such individuals called to discuss their 
views and insure that the Times was aware of their positions. [d. Mr. Frankel 
averaged one such phone call per night. [d. at 325. 
125. [d. at 324. The court also stated that "elected officials and public figures would 
eminently qualify as 'readers and subscribers' of the Times." [d. 
126. [d. at 324-25. The tax court noted that the Commissioner had issued no regulations 
and that nothing in the legislative history of section 280A suggested a contrary re-
sult. [d. at 325. 
127. 78 T.C. 428 (1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983). 
128. [d. at 434-36. 
129. Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 78 T.C. 428 (1982). 
130. Frankel v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 318 (1984). 
131. Green, 78 T.C. at 429. 
132. /d. at 434-35. 
133. [d. The tax court stated, however, that in most cases telephone contact would not 
satisfy the requirements of section 280A(c)(2). [d. at 436. 
134. [d. at 435. The tax court majority concluded that, "[e]ven if the term 'meeting' 
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tion 280A to interpret the statute. 13S The court stated: "Green's use of 
the room is not enough. The plain language of the statute requires that 
the office be used by clients as a place of business for meeting or dealing 
with the taxpayer."136 The appeals court criticized the tax court for its 
"metaphysical" reasoning that "dealing" means something less than 
physical use. 137 Instead, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Service's pos-
tulation that dealing could connote either "personal contact through 
which a deal is arranged" or "clients' meeting with the taxpayer's em-
ployee or agent."138 Accordingly, under the Ninth Circuit's analysiS a 
taxpayer will be denied a home office deduction unless "patients, clients, 
or customers" physically visit his home office. 139 
Because the tax court had not found the "plain meaning" of the 
statute to be so plain, the appeals court examined the legislative history 
of section 280A.I40 The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress's intent 
was to tie the home office deduction to expenses, and concluded that 
actual use of the home office by the client was necessary to insure that the 
taxpayer sustained home office expenses. 141 
In Frankel v. Commissioner,142 the tax court reconsidered its hold-
ing in Green. After reviewing the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the "plain 
meaning" of section 280A and its legislative history, the tax court agreed 
with the Ninth Circuit and declared it would no longer read the excep-
tion as: " '(B) as a place of business which is used by the taxpayer in 
meeting or dealing with patients, clients, or customers,' when in fact the 
words of the statute say just the opposite."143 The tax court acknowl-
edged that the policy underlying section 280A is to allow a deduction if 
were restricted to physical encounters, the addition of the word 'dealing,' used dis-
junctively, connotes a less immediate contact such as by a telephone call." [d. 
135. Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404, 405-07 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 78 T.C. 428 
(1982). 
136. Id. at 406 (emphasis in original). 
137. Id. 
138. [d. 
139. The Ninth Circuit also stated that the only other circuit to consider the issue was 
the Sixth Circuit in Cousino v. Commissioner, 679 F.2d 604 (6th Cir.), cerro denied, 
459 U.S. 1038 (1982), where the deduction was denied. 
In Frankel v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 318 (1984), Chief Judge Dawson argued 
in his dissenting opinion that reliance on Cousino was misplaced. [d. at 334 (Daw-
son, C.J., dissenting). In Chief Judge Dawson's view, Cousino was weak authority 
on this issue because it was summarily affirmed without oral argument and its re-
marks concerning the "meeting or dealing" requirement were mere dictum. [d. 
(Dawson, C.J., dissenting). 
140. Green, 707 F.2d at 407. 
141. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the other two exceptions provided in section 280A 
involved situations where taxpayers incurred substantial expenses in converting part 
of their home into a place of business. The court pointed out that a taxpayer who 
constructs a separate structure for business use is likely to incur a substantial ex-
pense. Similarly, a taxpayer who converts a room in his home into his "princpal 
place of business" is also likely to incur substantial expense. [d. 
142. 82 T.C. 318 (1984). 
143. [d. at 328. 
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the taxpayer incurs a substantial expense in converting a part of his home 
into a place of business. 144 Although the Frankel court found that the 
taxpayer used the claimed office exclusively for business and that the of-
fice had caused the taxpayer to incur substantial expenses, it denied the 
deduction because no clients visited the office. 14S 
Chief Judge Dawson, writing for the six dissenters, blasted the ma-
jority for its quick willingness to overrule its holding in Green. 146 The 
Chief Judge questioned the majority's adherence to the rules of stare de-
cisis and puzzled over whether taxpayers in later years would take a posi-
tion consistent with Green in hopes that the tax court might reverse its 
course again. 147 
The Chief Judge found that Congress enacted section 280A for two 
reasons: (1) to deny business deductions for personal expenses where 
there are little or no incremental costs associated with the business use 
of the residence; and (2) to provide a set of objective standards for deter-
mining the allowability of home office deductions. 148 According to the 
dissent, the first objective is met by the "exclusive use" and "regular ba-
sis" tests.149 It is, however, the requirements of subsections 
280A(c)(1)(A), (B), and (C) that provide the objective standards of Con-
gress's second objective. ISO Thus, allowing deductions when substantial 
home office expenses have been incurred comports with Congress's first 
objective, but does not, by itself, satisfy Congress's second objective. The 
dissent responds to the majority's "plain meaning" argument by assert-
ing that the majority focused on the words "used by clients" instead of 
the entire phrase "used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or 
dealing."lsl Under either focus, however, the dissent concluded that use 
by clients is satisfied by client-initiated telephone calls.152 
The dissent's position is well reasoned from a technical as well as a 
policy vantage point. Congress enacted section 280A to curtail taxpayer 
abuse in claiming home office deductions when the expenses of maintain-
ing the home office were nominal. The section is aimed at denying de-
ductions to taxpayers who use their home office for business and for 
pleasure, and as such entail no additional expenses for the business use. 
Without doubt, Congress has succeeded in prohibiting deductions to 
144. Id. at 328-29. 
145. Id. at 327-28. 
146. Id. at 331-32 (Dawson, C.l., dissenting). The dissent did not suggest that the tax 
court was unable to overrule its prior decision in Green. Instead, Chief ludge Daw-
son noted that the tax court in Green had fully considered the statutory language of 
section 280A and the pertinent legislative history, and therefore it should not re-
verse its position merely because the Ninth Circuit's interpretation differed. Id. 
(Dawson, C.l., dissenting). 
147. Id. (Dawson, C.l., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 333 (Dawson, C.l., dissenting). 
149. Id. (Dawson, C.l., dissenting). 
150. Id. (Dawson, C.l., dissenting). 
151. Id. at 333-34 (Dawson, C.l., dissenting). 
152. Id. at 332-33 (Dawson, C.l., dissenting). 
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nondeserving taxpayers, but at the same time it has prohibited deduc-
tions to deserving taxpayers who have incurred substantial expenses in 
maintaining a home office. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Green and the 
tax court's decision in Frankel are classic illustrations of deserving tax-
payers being denied home office deductions based on a shallow interpre-
tation of section 280A. But, as Chief Judge Dawson points out, the tax 
court is not so well settled that it may not again change course in the 
near future. 153 
D. Proposed Alternative 
Numerous courts deciding home office deduction cases have sympa-
thized with the taxpayers, but nonetheless denied the deduction. 154 As 
Judge Nims stated in Baie v. Commissioner: 155 
Section 280A provides a broad general rule requiring disallow-
ance of deductions attributable to the business use of a personal 
residence, irrespective of the type or form of business use. . . . 
Unfortunately for the petitioners here, the words of the law 
which Congress passed are straightforward and much broader 
in their applicability - sufficiently broad as to catch petitioners 
in their net. Weare not, therefore, at liberty to 'bend' the law, 
much as we may sympathize with petitioner's position.1s6 
Congress has excluded deductions for far more taxpayers than it in-
tended when it enacted section 280A. Congress's purpose was to disal-
low deductions for dubious claims that had little connection to the 
taxpayer's trade or business; those expenses that in reality were personal 
expenses. IS7 Because the courts have chosen not to remedy the problem 
by judicial fiat, Congress should respond by amending section 280A. It 
is suggested that section 280A(c)(1)(B) be amended to read as follows: 
(B) as a place of business used by the taxpayer in meeting 
or dealing with patients, clients, or customers in the normal 
course of his trade or business. 
The amended section would then parallel the interpretation the tax 
court originally gave the subsection in Green. lss The amendment would 
allow deductions to taxpayers who deserve them yet disallow deductions 
to nondeserving taxpayers. The suggested amendment would provide a 
closer tie between expenses and deductions but leave intact hurdles for a 
taxpayer to meet. That is, a taxpayer would still have four requirements 
153. [d. at 331 (Dawson, c.J., dissenting). 
154. See, e.g., Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.e. 105, 110 (1980); Garvey v. Commissioner, 
43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1003, 1006 (1982). 
155. 74 T.C. 105 (1980). 
156. [d. at 110. 
157. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
158. See Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428, 435 (1982), rev'd, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 
1983); see also Frankel v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 318, 328 (1984). 
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to satisfy: (1) exclusive use; (2) regular use; (3) meeting or dealing with 
patients, clients, or customers in the normal course of his trade or busi-
ness; and (4) in the case of an employee, use for the convenience of his 
employer. 1S9 
Under this amendment, the taxpayers in Green and Frankel would 
have qualified for deductions. In both instances the four-prong test was 
met and in both instances the taxpayers incurred expenses in their trade 
or business. For example, Frankel purchased his house because it had an 
extra room that could be converted into a home office. 160 A house with-
out an extra room would presumably cost less, and therefore the addi-
tional cost incurred by Frankel in purchasing the larger home should be 
attributable as an expense of his trade. 161 
In addition, whether the "meeting or dealing" is by telephone or in 
person should make no difference as long as it is in the normal course of 
business and the other three prongs of the test are satisfied. The courts' 
current distinction allows a taxpayer who is required by his employer to 
set up and maintain a home office for personal meetings with clients to 
deduct those expenses, but disallows a deduction to a taxpayer, such as 
Green, who is required by his employer to maintain a home office to 
"meet or deal" with clients by telephone. This distinction is without 
merit because both taxpayers incur the same expenses for employment 
reasons and, as such, should receive the same deductions. In contrast, 
the proposed amendment retains the goal of an objective standard, ties 
allowable deductions to business related expenses, and is no more diffi-
cult for the Service to administer than the current section. For these 
reasons, Congress should enact the proposed amendment to bring fair 
treatment to this area of section 280A. 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Avoidance of Section 280A 
With the numerous obstacles imposed by section 280A, many tax-
payers fail to qualify for a deduction for one reason or another. Conse-
quently, it is often beneficial for taxpayers to avoid the exclusionary effect 
159. The four enumerated requirements are the basic criteria under section 280A. See 
supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. 
160. Frankel, 82 T.C. at 328. 
161. Green would also have qualified for a home office deduction under the proposed 
amendment. Green met the four-prong test by using his home office "exclusively" 
and "regularly" to "deal" with "clients" and maintained the home office for the 
"convenience of his employer." Green, 707 F.2d at 406. Moreover, Green incurred 
expenses in his trade or business by maintaining his home office. The Second Cir-
cuit found that Green "never asserted that he sustained a major expense in setting 
aside a room for phone calls." ld. at 407. Green, however, did claim an $840 home 
office deduction, presumably based on depreciation and the cost of maintenance, 
utilities, and insurance. The IRS did not challenge the accuracy of the allocation of 
expenses. /d. at 405. Thus, it appears that Green did incur substantial expenses in 
his trade or business. 
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of the section by structuring their affairs to fall outside its purview. One 
method of sidestepping the home office deduction rules has recently with-
stood scrutiny by the tax court in Feldman v. Commissioner.162 
In Feldman, an en bane decision, the taxpayer was an employee, 
director and shareholder of a public accounting firm, and was responsible 
for substantial administrative duties. Because Feldman's work office was 
open to the rest of the staff, it lacked the privacy necessary for confiden-
tial discussions and uninterrupted work periods. 163 To fulfill his obliga-
tions, Feldman was expected to do a great deal of his work outside of the 
office, and he maintained an office in his home exclusively for that pur-
pose. Feldman and the firm negotiated a written lease agreement that 
provided for the firm to pay Feldman $5,400 each year for the use of his 
home office. l64 Feldman reported this amount as rental income and de-
ducted from it the costs of maintaining the leased office. 16s The IRS dis-
allowed the deduction, claiming that the arrangement was a sham. The 
Service argued that the payment was labeled as "rental income" instead 
of "compensation" solely to circumvent the rules of section 280A.166 
The tax court held that the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction under 
section 280A(c)(3), which allows the deduction of expenses associated 
with the rental of a dwelling unit. 167 
Although the court found that the rental provided in the agreement 
was excessive and that the lease was not negotiated at arm's length, it 
nonetheless held the agreement to be "bona fide."168 The Feldman court 
added that a business necessity was required to support such a lease 
agreement. The court held that the problems of confidentiality and fre-
quent interruptions in Feldman's work office gave rise to a business ne-
cessity for the lease agreement. 169 The Feldman court stated that the 
"degree of business necessity [here] goes far beyond the 'appropriate and 
helpful' standard for deduction of home office [expenses] .... "170 
The Feldman decision provides tax advisors with a valuable plan-
ning tool. In most cases, when an employee claims a home office deduc-
tion he must meet the "principal place of business" or "meeting or 
162. 84 T.e. 1 (1985). 
163. Id. at 2. 
164. [d. at 2-3. 
165. Id. at 3. 
166. Id. at 5. 
167. Id. at 5-7. 
168. Id. The tax court stated that the "excessive rent [did] not necessarily taint the char-
acter of the entire payment," but was only one factor considered in determining the 
validity of the lease agreement. Id. at 6. Similarly, the Feldman court found that a 
close relationship between the lessor and the lessee did not void the agreement, but 
merely subjected it to closer scrutiny to ensure that the payments made were for the 
rental of the property. [d. 
169. [d. 
170. Id. Judge Nims concurring opinion, joined by five other judges, noted that "close 
scrutiny will be given similar fact patterns in the future where the possibility of 
compensation disguised as rent may be present." Id. at 9 (Nims, J., concurring). 
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dealing" exception.17l This is often difficult because an employee's 
"principal place of business" is generally held to be at the employer's 
office, and because few employees meet personally with clients in their 
home office. Therefore, as a general rule, the cost of maintaining the 
home office is not deductible. Under a rental agreement, however, the 
strict home office deduction rules do not apply, and the employee can 
deduct his home office expenses against his rental income. 
The benefits of a rental agreement can best be illustrated by the fol-
lowing example: 
Assume that Bob and Sue Johnson are the sole shareholders of 
ABC Corporation (the Corporation), which operates a retail 
sporting goods store. Because of limited office space in the 
store, it is necessary for Bob to do most of the Corporation's 
paperwork at home. The cost of maintaining the home office is 
$2,000 and its fair rental value is $4,000. The Corporation has 
earnings and profits of $4,000 and the Johnsons have personal 
income of $25,000. 
Bob would not qualify for a home office deduction under section 
280A( c)( 1) because his "principal place of business" is at the store, and 
he does not "meet or deal" with "clients" in his home office. The John-
sons, therefore, have four options: (1) not to distribute the corporate 
earnings; (2) distribute $4,000 as a dividend; (3) draw a $4,000 salary 
bonus; or (4) enter into a rental agreement with the Corporation. The 
first two options have a substantial drawback: these methods subject the 
Johnsons to double taxation (that is, once at the corporate level and then 
again upon distribution at the shareholder level). Although the third op-
tion reduces income and tax at the corporate level, the Johnsons would 
report $4,000 as income and the Corporation would be liable for $422 of 
payroll taxes. l72 
The fourth option, using a Feldman lease agreement, provides three 
advantages. First, the Corporation would deduct $4,000 as rental ex-
pense and reduce income and tax at the corporate level. Second, the 
Johnsons would report $4,000 of gross rental income and $2,000 of home 
office expenses, resulting in net rental income of only $2,000. Third, the 
Corporation would not be forced to pay additional payroll taxes. 
The chart below sets forth the results under each of the four options. 
171. The taxpayer may also qualify for a deduction by using a "separate structure," 
I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1)(C) (1982), or "inventory storage" space, id. § 280A(c)(2). 
172. Based on average 1984 rates, the corporation would pay 7.05% Social Security Tax, 
0.8% Federal Unemployment Tax, and 2.7% Maryland State Unemployment Tax, 
thus, resulting in total payroll taxes of $422 (10.55% X $4000 = $422). See Treas. 
Pub. 539, Employment Taxes and Information Return Requirements, 31,225, 
31,233, 31,237 (Rev. Nov. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 8 (1979 & Supp. 
1984). 
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Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Corporate Income $ 4,000 $ 4,000 <$422> $ 0 
Corporate Tax 600 600 0 0 
Personal Income 25,000 29,000 29,000 27,000 
Personal Tax 3,565 4,665 4,665 4,065 
Total Tax 4,165 5,265 4,665 4,065 
The Iohnsons must take steps to document the "bona fide" nature of 
the transaction and to ensure that a "business necessity" underscores the 
rental agreement. To evidence the "bona fide" nature of the transaction, 
the Iohnsons and the Corporation should execute a simple written lease 
at the beginning of the Corporation's tax year. The lease should provide 
for rent at the home office's fair rental value of $4,000. Furthermore, 
special attention should be taken to ensure that the Corporation makes 
timely lease payments. With respect to the "business necessity," it would 
be advisable for the corporate minutes to show that the rental agreement 
was executed to provide adequate space and privacy for the completion 
of corporate paperwork. In sum, the rental agreement approach pro-
vides a viable and attractive alternative to section 280A for taxpayers to 
deduct home office expenses. 
B. Record Keeping 
It is well settled that the taxpayer has the burden of proving that 
any deficiency assessed by the Service is incorrect. 173 Accordingly, it is 
important for each taxpayer to keep adequate records to support his de-
duction. In the IRS publication, Business Use of Your Home,174 the Ser-
vice states that no particular method of record keeping is required, only 
that the records necessary to figure the deduction be kept. 175 The Ser-
vice, however, suggests that cancelled checks, receipts, and other evi-
dence of expenses paid be retained. 176 
In Diller v. Commissioner,l77 the tax court reiterated the maxim that 
taxpayers "have the burden of proof to establish both the amount and 
character of the expense."178 Diller produced only vague and general 
testimony as to expenses incurred and, consequently, the court refused to 
speculate as to those expenses and denied the entire deduction. 179 Simi-
larly, the tax court has found unpersuasive a taxpayer's argument that 
the deduction "represented the minimum expenses that could have been 
incurred in ... using a portion of [his] home for business purposes."180 
173. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); see supra note 49. 
174. Treas. Pub. 587, Business Use of Your Home, 35,401 (Rev. Nov. 1984). 
175. Id. at 35,402. 
176. Id.; see a/so Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(d) (1958). 
177. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1332 (1978). 
178. Id. at 1335 (citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. Ill, 115 (1933) and Tax R. Prac. & 
Proc. 142(a)) (emphasis supplied). 
179. Diller, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1335. 
180. Carlson v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090, 1091-92 (1981). 
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Moreover, many taxpayers have failed to meet their burden of proof 
when their only evidence was their own self-serving testimony.181 
Section 274(d) sets forth the record keeping necessary to claim a 
deduction for travel, entertainment, and giftS. 182 The section requires 
contemporaneous record keeping and documentary evidence. Although 
section 274(d), of course, is not controlling on home office deductions, it 
does provide basic guidelines for substantiating any deduction. To sub-
stantiate the regular use of a home office, it is advisable to keep a diary 
that includes the date of use, the amount of time used, the business pur-
pose, and the patients, clients, or customers present. Similarly, to sub-
stantiate gross income attributable to the home office, a time sheet and 
the related billings should be kept for all work done in the home office. 
Testimony by the taxpayer and others may be used to verify the exclusive 
use test, but it must be remembered that the taxpayer has the burden of 
persuasion. 
In some cases where taxpayers have kept inadequate records, not 
only have their deductions been denied, but they have also been assessed 
a penalty for filing an inaccurate return. 183 Section 6653 states that when 
an underpayment of tax is "due to negligence or intentional disregard of 
[the] rules or regulations" a penalty may be imposed. 184 A taxpayer may 
be penalized five percent of the underpayment when the tax return is filed 
without an intent to defraud, but is subject to a penalty of fifty percent of 
the underpayment when the underpayment is attributable to fraud. 18s 
C. Limitation on Deduction 
A deduction for expenses related to the use of part of a residence for 
business purposes is limited in two ways: (1) the type of expense allowed; 
and (2) the amount of expense allowed. 
There are three types of expenses related to the maintenance of a 
home office: direct, indirect, and unrelated. 186 Direct expenses are those 
costs incurred specifically for the home office. Painting, repairing, and 
181. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 696 (1981) (regular use not shown); 
Roth v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 45 (1981) (gross income attributable to 
home office not proven); Andrews v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1533 (1981) 
(exclusive use not shown), aff'd by unpublished order (4th Cir. July 6, 1982); Klutz 
v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 724 (1979) (percentage of home used for busi-
ness not shown). But see Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428 (1982) (exclusive use 
shown), rev'd on other grounds, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983); see also supra notes 
50-53 and accompanying text. 
182. I.R.C. § 274(d) (West Supp. 1984). 
183. See, e.g., McCabe v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 390 (1983); Taylor v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077 (1981). 
184. I.R.C. § 6653 (1982). 
185. Id. § 6653(a)-(b). In McCabe v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 390 (1983), the 
tax court sustained the imposition of a negligence penalty by the Service. The tax-
payer made several omissions and unjustified deductions. His excuse of "general 
confusion" did not refute the determination of negligence. Id. at 394. 
186. Treas. Pub. 587, Business Use of Your Home, 35,401, 35,401-02 (Rev. Nov. 1984). 
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cleaning the office are examples of expenses directly related to the use of 
the home office for business purposes. As such, the full cost of the direct 
expenses are deductible within the statutory limitation. 
By contrast, indirect expenses are those costs that benefit the entire 
house. These expenses are for the general maintenance and upkeep of the 
entire home. For example, real estate taxes are an expense that benefit 
not only the office portion of a home, but the entire home. Likewise, the 
cost of mortgage interest, home insurance, rent, utilities, repairs, and de-
preciation are indirect expenses. Because the cost of an indirect expense 
is not exclusively for the benefit of the business portion of the home, an 
allocation must be made. ls7 The allocation can be made on any reason-
able basis; however, the Service suggests allocation on a per room basis 
where rooms are of about equal size, or otherwise on a square foot 
basis. ISS 
Unrelated expenses are those costs incurred in maintaining a home 
that do not benefit the business portion. For instance, repairs to the 
stove in the kitchen will be of no business benefit to an accountant's 
home office. ls9 The proposed regulations state that lawn care expenses 
are unrelated expenses and not allocable as a deduction. l90 In Graves v. 
Commissioner,191 however, a pre-section 280A case, the tax court held in 
a memorandum opinion that lawn care expenses were deductible for a 
professional who used his home office as a place to meet clients. 192 The 
tax court reasoned that expenses related to the care and maintenance of 
the entrance were "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. 193 Pre-
sumably, the holding in Graves is premised on the rationale that if clients 
are to visit the taxpayer's home office, the entrance to the home office 
must be accessible and maintained. Although Graves was only a memo-
randum decision and predated the enactment of section 280A, its ration-
ale is sound and should support a deduction under section 280A. But, if 
a taxpayer uses his home office as his "principal place of business" and 
no clients visit the office, the Graves rationale will be of no assistance to 
the taxpayer in arguing against the Service's proposed regulation. 
Once a taxpayer has determined he is eligible for a home office de-
duction and has calculated the appropriate home office expenses, he must 
then apply the overall limit imposed by Code section 280A(c)(5). The 
187. [d. 
188. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(3) (proposed Aug. 7, 1980); see also Feldman v. 
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1 (1985) (where rooms in the home are not of equal size, an 
allocation must be made on a square foot basis). 
189. See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(3) (proposed Aug. 7, 1980). Unrelated ex-
penses also include "repairs to personal areas of [the] home ... and landscaping." 
Treas. Pub. 587, Business Use of Your Home, at 35,402. 
190. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(3) (proposed Aug. 7, 1980). 
191. 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 148 (1961). 
192. The taxpayer ran a "country style" law practice from his rural home. [d. at 149. 
193. [d. The court allowed deductions for the cost of snow shoveling, lawn mowing, and 
other services necessary for the maintenance of the entrance. [d. 
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statute provides that expenses related to the home office that would not 
be deductible but for the business use cannot exceed: 
(1) The gross income for the taxable year derived from the home 
office, less 
(2) The deductions allocable to such use that are allowable without 
reference to section 280A.194 
The Congressional committee reports explain the limitation and the 
amount of deduction, and provide an analysis of its application. 19s This 
legislative history further provides that where gross income is derived 
from both the business use of part of the home and from other facilities, a 
reasonable allocation based on the particular facts and circumstances is 
to be made. The deduction is limited to gross income attributable to the 
home office in excess of deductions allowed without regard to the tax-
payer's business (e.g., interest and taxes).196 
Because "gross income" for purposes of section 280A is neither de-
fined in the statute nor in the legislative history, the general definition of 
"gross income" under section 61 should govern. Section 61 broadly de-
fines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived 
.... "197 Not surprisingly, the tax court has decided in interpreting sec-
tion 280A(c)(5) that when a taxpayer produces no income from the use 
of a portion of his home, no home office deduction is allowed. 198 
Curiously, proposed regulation section 1.280A-2(i) sets forth a defi-
nition of gross income different from section 61 and posits an order for 
deductions different from that provided for in section 280A(c)(5).199 The 
regulation defines gross income as "gross income from the business activ-
ity in the unit reduced by expenditures required for the activity but not 
allocable to use of the unit itself, such as expenditures for supplies and 
compensation paid to other persons."200 This definition realigns the or-
der of deductions by first reducing gross income by ordinary expenses not 
related to the maintenance of the home office, and in effect limits the 
home office deduction to net income. Section 280A(c)(5), however, pro-
194. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5) (1982). 
195. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161-62 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897, 3055; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3581-82. 
196. H.R. REp. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161-62 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897,3055; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3581-82. 
197. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982). This definition includes "gross income derived from busi-
ness." [d. § 61(a)(2). 
198. See, e.g., Gestrich V. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 525 (1980), aff'd by unpublished opin-
ion, 681 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1982); Parker V. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1760 
(1984); Warganz V. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 568 (1981), aff'd by unpub-
lished opinion, 696 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1982); Hughes V. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1153 (1981). 
199. Compare Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(2)(iii) (proposed July 21, 1983), with 
I.R.C. § 61(a) (1982) and id. § 280A(c)(5). 
200. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(2)(iii) (proposed July 21, 1983). 
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vides for gross income, not net income.201 Furthermore, the legislative 
history provides no authority for a different interpretation.202 
In a private letter ruling, the Service informed the taxpayer, an ac-
countant operating his business out of his home, that gross income did 
not mean gross receipts. 203 The Service relied on the proposed regula-
tions and asserted without further reasoning that gross income meant 
"gross income from the business activity ... reduced by expenditures 
required for the activity .... "204 Considering section 280A's express 
use of the term gross income, the Service's position is suspect. 
Subsection (c)( 5) of the proposed regulations states that business de-
ductions associated with the use of a home office are allowable in the 
following order: 
(1) the allocable portion of home office deductions allowable with-
out regard to any use of the home for trade or business (e.g., mortgage 
interest and real estate taxes); 
(2) home operating expenses allocable for the business portion of 
the residence that do not result in a reduction of the basis of the property 
(i.e., utilities, insurance, repairs); 
(3) home operating expenses allocable to the business portion of the 
residence that do reduce basis (i.e., depreciation).205 
Again, there is no statutory authority or legislative history to sup-
port the Service's rearrangement of the order of expenses. Seemingly, the 
proposed regulations do not comport with the Code and, therefore, 
should fail. 
Moreover, the proposed regulations contravene Congress's intent in 
enacting section 280A. Normally, when a taxpayer incurs a loss in the 
operation of his trade or business, his loss is fully deductible.206 The 
effect of the proposed regulations, however, is that no taxpayer reaches 
or increases a net loss by use of the home office deduction. The legisla-
tive intent of section 280A was aimed at eliminating taxpayer abuses in 
the home office area that resulted in personal and family expenses being 
deducted as business expenses.207 Congress also sought to limit home 
office deductions associated with a bona fide business use of a home. 
Congress did not set out to punish, by limiting their deductions, entre-
preneurs working out of their home. Notwithstanding this apparent 
Congressional intent, many commentators,208 and at least one profes-
201. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5)(A) (1982). 
202. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161-62 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2897,3055; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 149 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3439, 3581-82. 
203. Private Letter Ruling 8347012, 352 IRS LTR. RuL. (CCH) 8347012 (Aug. 15, 
1983). 
204.Id. 
205. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-2(i)(5) (proposed Aug. 7, 1980). 
206. I.R.C. § 165(c)(I) (1982). 
207. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
208. See, e.g., Kulsrud, Recent Statutory and Judicial Development Have Liberalized 
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sional tax service,209 teach the method prescribed by the regulations. 
The area seems ripe for litigation.2lO * 
The mechanical differences between the Code and the proposed reg-
ulation can best be illustrated by the following example: 
Assume that Diane Smith is a lawyer employed full time 
as a professor. On a part time basis, Diane operates a private 
law practice from her home. Diane uses one-fifth of her resi-
dence exclusively and regularly as her "principal place of busi-
ness" and as a place to meet clients. Diane earns $3,300 of 
gross income from her private practice. She pays the following 







In addition, she incurs the following home ownership expenses: 
Roof repair 













As shown below, under the Code's limitation on liabilities, Diane 
would deduct $2,640 for home office expenses and would show a net loss 
of $500. On the other hand, using the limitations imposed by the pro-
posed regulations, Diane would only deduct $2,140 for home office ex-
penses and would show neither gain nor loss from her legal practice. 
Home-Office Deductions, 56 J. TAX'N 340, 350-51 (1982); Ward, Home Office De-
ductions: The Development and Current Status of Section 280A(c)(J), 13 CUM. L. 
REv. 195, 214-16 (1982-83); Comment, The Home Office Deduction, 25 ST. LoUIS 
u.L.J. 607, 623-26 (1981). 
209. BENDER'S TAX RETURN MANUAL ~ 341.3(1) (1985). 
210. In 1981, a taxpayer successfully challenged the proposed regulations governing de-
ductions allowable on vacation homes as being inconsistent with section 
280A(c)(5)(B). Bolton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 104 (1981), aff'd, 694 F.2d 556 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
• After this issue went to press, the tax court reviewed the proposed regulations' limi-
tation on home office deductions in Scott v. Commissioner, TAX Cr. REp. (CCH) 
Dec. 42,024,2936 (1985). The tax court found the Commissioner's interpretation of 
the term "gross income" to be inconsistent with section 280A's legislative history 
and its purpose. The Scott court rejected the proposed regulations' definition of 
"gross income" and adopted the Section 61 definition of "gross income." Id. at 
2940. 
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Code Section 280A (c)(5) Method 
Gross income from private law practice 
Less: Interest 





Limitation on home office deductions 
Total 
Less: Roof repair $ 600 





Gross income after home-related expenses 



















Proposed Regulation § 1.280A-2(i)(5) Method 
Gross income from private law practice 
Less: Secretarial services 
Supplies 
Postage 




Gross income as defined by regulation § 1.280A-2(i)(5) 
Allocable 
Total to office 
Less: Interest 
Real estate taxes 
$ 900 
1,700 
Total expenses allocable to office 
deductible regardless of business use 
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Total 
Less: Roof repair $ 600 
Lawn care 250 
Home insurance 550 
Utilities 1,000 
Total non-basis reducing home office expenses 










Less: Depreciation $8,200 $1,640 
Portion of depreciation expense allowed up to 
limitation 
Net income or loss 





For a taxpayer who contemplates claiming a home office deduction 
under section 280A, it is important that he consider the effect of the de-
duction in relation to the section 1034 rollover provisions. Section 1034 
provides for the non-recognition of gain in certain cases where a taxpayer 
sells his home and purchases a replacement home.211 When the home is 
used by the taxpayer as both his principal residence and as a place of 
business, an allocation must be made between the two uses.212 Only the 
gain on the residential portion is given non-recognition treatment; the 
gain on the business portion must be recognized.213 
The Service originally declared in a private letter ruling that the 
business use requirements for a home office deduction under section 
280A were not determinitive of whether the residence was being used for 
a non-residential purpose under section 1034.214 Three years later, how-
ever, Revenue Ruling 82-26 held that an allocation is only necessary 
under section 1034 when a home office deduction is taken under section 
280A.215 Therefore, if the taxpayer fails to qualify for a home office de-
duction in the year of sale, no allocation is required, and the entire gain is 
unrecognized. 
Hence, it appears advantageous to take a deduction for home office 
expenses in any year except the year of sale.216 Nonetheless, two nega-
211. I.R.C. § 1034(a) (1982). 
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.l034-1(c)(3)(ii) (1960). 
213.Id. 
214. Private Letter Ruling 7935003, 131 IRS LTR. RuL. (CCH) 7935003 (May 14, 
1979). 
215. Rev. Rul. 82-26, 1982-1 C.B. 114-15. 
216. For a detailed analysis and computation of when taking a home office deduction in 
the year of sale is advantageous, see Everett, Home Office Expense Deductions: 
More Trouble Than They Are Worth?, 58 TAXES 589, 591-92 (1980). 
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tive consequences result from taking the deduction: (1) the basis of the 
house is reduced by the depreciation taken, which will cause a higher 
gain upon sale;217 and (2) because the IRS is wary of home office deduc-
tions and specifically asks on a separate line of the Federal income tax 
return if any expense related to a home office is being deducted,218 seem-
ingly, the chance of an audit is enhanced. These disadvantages should be 
weighed by each taxpayer, but on the whole the advantages of claiming a 
deduction will probably outweigh the disadvantages. 
v. CONCLUSION 
No statutory rule is without problems and nearly all require a lim-
ited amount of judicial gloss. Congress enacted section 280A to achieve 
two goals: (1) to eliminate taxpayer abuse of home office deductions; and 
(2) to provide objective rules to stem the flow of litigation. The judicial 
interpretation of the various clauses of section 280A has in many in-
stances served to frustrate, rather than to promote Congress's goals. 
For example, the adoption by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit of the "time and importance" test for determining whether a 
home office is a "principal place of business" fails to meet the Congres-
sional goals of an objective and easily applied standard. The tax court's 
"focal point" test, however, furthers the Congressional goals, and is 
therefore a better standard. In addition, the judicial construction of the 
"meeting or dealing" exception has created inequity by denying deduc-
tions to taxpayers who incur substantial expenses in maintaining home 
offices used only for telephone contact with clients. Legislative reform, 
whether by the proposed amendment or by some other means, is neces-
sary to remedy the situation. 
Qualifying for a home office deduction requires careful planning. 
First, the use of a Feldman - rental agreement should be considered when 
a taxpayer cannot otherwise qualify for a home office deduction, so as to 
allow the taxpayer a home office deduction "through the backdoor." 
Second, as with all deductions, good record keeping and substantiation 
are vital to securing a full deduction. Third, the deduction limitation 
imposed by the proposed regulations is inconsistent with section 280A 
and, as such, should not withstand a challenge before a court. Fourth, 
gain on the sale of a home is deferrable to the extent it is used as a resi-
dence in the year of sale, and therefore, a calculation is necessary to de-
termine whether a home office deduction should be taken. 
Section 280A is fraught with problems and in need of both legisla-
tive reform and pragmatic judicial interpretation. Nonetheless, section 
217. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1982). 
218. TREAS. PUDL., PACKAGE X, 75, line G (1984). 
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280A, as it stands, remains a valuable tax planning tool worthy of tax-
payer consideration. 
Mark T. Holtschneider 
